The proposed identity management system has multiple layers
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The NIR (National Identity Register) — individual checking and numbering
of the population — marking many personal details as "registrable facts"
to be disclosed and constantly updated — collection and checking of
biometrics (e.g. fingerprints) — the card itself — a widespread
scanner network and secure (one hopes) infrastructure connecting it to the
central database — provision for use across the private and public
sectors — data-sharing between organisations on an unprecedented scale.
50 categories of registrable fact are set out in the Bill, though they
could be added to. Effectively an index to all other official and
quasi-official records, through cross-references and an audit trail of
all checks on the Register, the NIR would be the key to a total life history of
every individual, to be retained even after death.
Every registered individual will be under an obligation to notify any change in
registrable facts. It is a clear aim of the system to require identity
verification for many more civil transactions, the occasions to be
stored in the audit trail. Information verified and indexed by numbers from the
NIR would be easily cross-referenced in any database or set of databases. The
"meta-database" of all the thousands of databases cross-referenced is much more
powerful and much less secure than the NIR itself.
Many western countries that have ID cards do not have a shared register. Mostly
ID cards have been limited in use, with strong legal privacy protections. In
Germany centralisation is forbidden for historical reasons, and when cards are
replaced, the records are not linked. Belgium has made use of modern encryption
methods and local storage to protect privacy and prevent data-sharing, an
approach opposite to the Home Office's. The UK scheme is closest to those of
some Middle Eastern countries and of the People's Republic of
China—though the latter has largely given up on biometrics.
The Government has not made a case. There is no evidence the system will
produce the stated benefits. Less liberty does not imply greater
security.
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ID does not establish intention. Competent criminals and terrorists will be
able to subvert the identity system. Random outrages by individuals can't be
stopped. Ministers agree that ID cards will not prevent atrocities. A
blank assertion that the department would find it helpful is not an argument
that would be entertained for fundamental change in any other sphere of
government but national security. Where is the evidence? Research suggests
there is no link between the use of identity cards and the prevalence
of terrorism, and in no instance has the presence of an identity card system
been shown a significant deterrent to terrorist activity. Experts attest that
ID unjustifiably presumed secure actually diminishes security.
People will still enter Britain using foreign documents—genuine or
forged—and ID cards offer no more deterrent to people smugglers than
passports and visas. Employers already face substantial penalties for failing
to obtain proof of entitlement to work, yet there are only a handful of
prosecutions a year.
Identity is "only a tiny part of the problem in the benefit system." Figures
for claims under false identity are estimated at £50 million (2.5%) of an
(estimated) £2 billion per year in fraudulent claims.
Both Australia and the USA have far worse problems of identity theft than
Britain, precisely because of general reliance on a single reference source.
Costs usually cited for of identity-related crime here include much fraud not
susceptible to an ID system. Nominally "secure", trusted, ID is more
useful to the fraudster. The Home Office has not explained how it will stop
registration by identity thieves in the personae of innocent others. Coherent
collection of all sensitive personal data by government, and its easy
transmission between departments, will create vast new opportunities for
data-theft.
IT providers find that identity systems work best when limited in design. The
Home Office scheme combines untested technologies on an unparalleled scale. Its
many inchoate purposes create innumerable points for failure. The government
record with computer projects is poor, and the ID system is likely to end up a
broken mess.
Not all biometrics will work for all people. Plenty are missing digits, or
eyes, or have physical conditions that render one or more biometrics unstable
or hard to read. All systems have error. Deployment on a vast scale, with
variably trained operators and variably maintained and calibrated equipment,
will produce vast numbers of mismatches, leading to potentially gross
inconvenience to millions.
Identity Cards will cost money that could be better spent
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The Government has not ventured figures for the cost to the country as whole of
the identity management scheme. That makes evaluation difficult. Civil Service
IT experience suggests current projections are likely to be seriously
underestimated. Home Office figures are for internal costs only, and have risen
sharply—where they are not utterly obscure. Industry estimates suggest
that public and private sector compliance costs could easily be double whatever
is spent centrally.
The Government has not even tried to show that national ID management will be
more cost-effective than less spectacular alternative, targeted, solutions to
the same problems (whether tried and tested or novel). We are to trust to luck
that it is.
Even at current Home Office estimates, the additional tax burden of setting up
the scheme will be of the order of £200 per person. The direct cost to
individuals (of a combined passport and ID card package) is quoted as £93. The
impact on other departmental and local authority budgets is unknown. The scope
and impact of arbitrary penalties would make speed cameras trivial by
comparison.
The Home Office seeks wide discretion over the future shape of the scheme.
There are more than 30 types of regulatory power for future Secretaries of
State that would change the functions and content of the system ad
lib. The scope, application and possible extension are extra-parliamentary
decisions, even if nominally subject to approval.
Data entered onto the National Identity Register (NIR) is arbitrarily presumed
to be accurate, and the Home Secretary made a judge of accuracy of information
provided to him. Meanwhile, the Home Office gets the power to enter information
without informing the individual. But theres no duty to ensure that such data
is accurate, or criterion of accuracy. Personal identity is implicitly made
wholly subject to state control.
Even during the so-called "voluntary phase", the Home Secretary can add any
person to the Register without their consent, and categories of individuals
might be compelled selectively to register using powers under any future
legislation. Anyone newly applying for a passport or other "designated
document", or renewing an existing one, will automatically have to be
interviewed and submit all required details. This is less a phased introduction
than a clandestine one. There is to be no choice. And the minimum of notice to
the public about the change in the handling of their registrable information.
As proposed, the National Identity Scheme Commissioner would have very limited
powers and is excluded from considering a number of key issues. He does not
even report directly to Parliament. The reliance on administrative penalties
means severe punishments may be inflicted without judicial process. The onus is
on the individual to seek relief from the courts, at a civil standard of proof.
Those who most require the protection of a fair trial are the least likely to
be able to resort to legal action.
Without reference to the courts or any appeals process, the Home Secretary may
cancel or require surrender of an identity card, without a right of appeal, at
any time. Given that the object of the scheme is that an ID card will be
eventually required to exercise any ordinary civil function, this amounts to
granting the Home Secretary the power of civic life and death.
The National Identity Register creates specific new threats to
individuals
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There have been vapid "assurances" made to some minority groups. That underlines
the potential for threat. The system offers a ready-made police-state tool for
a future government less trustworthy than the current one. A Home Secretary
could create classifications of individuals to be registered as he sees fit,
introducing onerous duties backed by severe penalties for fractions of the
population. Religious or ethnic affiliation, for example, could be added to the
Register by regulation—or be inferred by cross-referencing other
information using a National Identity Register Number or associated data.
ID cards in practice would provide a pretext for those in
authority—public or private—to question individuals who stand out
for reasons of personal appearance or demeanour. This is likely to exacerbate
divisions in society. The Chairman of the Bar Council has asked, "is there not
a great risk that those who feel at the margins of society—the somewhat
disaffected—will be driven into the arms of extremists?"
The requirement that all those registered notify all changes in details risks
creating the means of tracking and persecution through improper use of the
database. A variety of persons have good reason to conceal their identity and
whereabouts; for example: those fleeing domestic abuse; victims of "honour"
crimes; witnesses in criminal cases; those at risk of kidnapping; undercover
investigators; refugees from oppressive regimes overseas; those pursued by the
press; those who may be terrorist targets. The seizure of ID cards (like
benefit-books and passports now) will become a means for extortion by
gangsters.
By making ordinary life dependent on the reliability of a complex
administrative system, the scheme makes myriad small errors potentially
catastrophic. There's no hint from the government how it will deal with
inevitably large numbers of mis-identifications and errors, or deliberate
attacks on or corruption of what would become a critical piece of national
infrastructure. A failure in any part of the system at a check might deny a
person access to his or her rights or property or to public services, with no
immediate solution or redress—"license to live" withdrawn.
